James C. Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co by Steinberg, Erwin E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 
January 1920 
James C. Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co 
Erwin E. Steinberg 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Contracts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Erwin E. Steinberg, James C. Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co, 5 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 086 (1920). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Published Quarterly During the University Year by the
Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
CHARLs NAGL JoHN F. LEE
Ew~aR C. ELroT WALT D. CoLts
RiCHARD L. GooDE JOHN F. SEPLEY
JAmES A. SEnDoN FRANKLIN FEmiss
THEODORE RAssmFUR P. TAYLOR BYtAN
EDITOR
P. F. PLUMMER
BUSINESS MANAGER
WESLEY A. LUEDERS
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
J. H. ZUMBALEN E. B, CONANT
NOTES
JAMES C. FLYNN VS. LITTLE FALLS ELECTRIC &
WATER CO."
The very contract, which the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the
case of James F1ynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co. declared
void, was adjudged in an independent action in the Federal Court in the
case of Little Falls Electric & Water Co. vs. City of Little alls, 2 to
be valid and binding upon the city of Little Falls. What is more, in
spite of the maze of inconsistent reasoning found in the Flynn case, a
diligent search among later cases in this state shows that there is a
great reluctance to overrule the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision.
In Reed vs. City of Anoka," there is a poor attempt to distinguish the
1. 74 Minn., 180.
2. 102 Fed. (C. C.), 663.
3. 85 Minn., 294.
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earlier case, when in fact, a polite overruling is evident. In addition,
since the decision in Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co., the
Federal Courts have religiously declared valid, in independent pro-
ceedings concerning the impairment of contract rights, what the Min-
nesota State Courts, following the Flynn case, have declared void. It
is evident, therefore, that Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co.
stands as Minnesota law on the question of the TIME ELEMENT IN
MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS. This case, which cannot stand as
satisfactory reasoning from a legal standpoint, is the subject of this
note.
The facts which are essential for a consideration of the case are
these:
In January, 1889, the city council of Little Falls passed an ordi-
nance which granted to certain persons, their successors, or assigns,
FOR THIRTY YEARS, the privilege of laying water pipes and
mains in the streets of the city on the following, among other, terms
and conditions: The grantees were to maintain the mains and water-
works ready for fire protection and operate the waterworks, after their
completion, for a full term of thirty years. For the use of fire hydrants,
which were 55 in number, the city was to pay $80 per year for a full
term of thirty years. The grantees assigned all their rights under the
ordinance to the defendants, the Little Falls Electric & Water Co. The
ordinance was accepted by the grantees and the waterworks were con-
structed and put in operation, and presumably, in absence of any alle-
gation to the contrary, the water company has complied with all the
terms and conditions of the ordinance.
The plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer of the city, brings this
action, in behalf of himself and all other taxpayers, to enjoin the city
and its officers from carrying out the provisions of the ordinance by
paying the Water Company $80 per year for each of the 55 hydrants,
on the grounds that the needs of the city are not, and will not for
years, require a greater number of hydrants than 35; that $80 per
year per hydrant is unreasonable and exorbitant, and at least $40 per
hydrant per year higher than the reasonable value thereof; and that
the ordinance, at least in so far as it assumes to pay this price for all
these hydrants FOR THIRTY YEARS IS VOID, because it is not
within the scope of the power or authority of the city.
To this complaint, the Water Co. interposed a demurrer on the
ground that the complaint did not state a cause of action.4
It is well settled that contracts by the authorities of a city, .for
4. Facts as in 74 Minn., 180.
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water to be furnished the city, and its inhabitants, are not made in the
exercise of governmental powers, but of its proprietary or business
interests, and are governed by the rules applicable to contracts made by
individuals or business corporations. Such contracts, WHEN FAIR-
LY MADE, WITHOUT FRAUD, OR BAD FAITH ON THE
PART OF THE CITY OFFICERS, and which are NOT UNREA-
SONABLE WHEN MADE, cannot be repudiated by the municipality
after the private party has expended money in the building of the
works in reliance thereon, and so long as such party complies with its
provisions.5 To put the proposition in a different way, a court may
rule that such a contract is void, if IN ITS INCEPTION, IT SHOW-
ED FRAUD, OR WAS UNREASONABLE WHEN MADE. This
test is the only true way to determine the validity of municipal
contracts.
Yet the fact remains, that long term contracts for a water supply
have been attacked as granting monopolies, as unreasonable, as con-
tracting away legislative powers, and what not. But today authority is
almost unanimous in holding that if a contract is REASONABLE IN
ITS INCEPTION, THE TIME ELEMENT, if not perpetual, has
no effect in invalidating the contract. The following authorities sustain
long term contracts of the same tenor and effect as those which we
have under consideration; the time ranging from ten to fifty years: Reed
vs. City ; Little Falls Electric & Water Co. vs. City;7 New Orleans Wa-
ter Co. vs. Rivers;8 Vicksburg Water Co. vs. City;' Boerth vs. Detroit
Gas Co. ;1o Ills. Say. & Trust Co. vs. Arkansas City ;11 Creston Water-
works Co. vs. Creston ;12 Oconto vs. City ;13 Grant vs. City ;14 Wo.stern
vs. City ;5 City vs. Memphis ;16 City vs. East St. Louis,17 and Atlantic
City vs. Atlantic. s
Thus it can be readily seen that when the validity of the kind of
contract which we have under consideration is questioned, the only
5. Little Falls Electric & Water Co. vs. City, 102 Fed., 663. For other
cases on this topic see: Valparaiso v. Gardner, 97 Ind., 1; Ills. Tr. & Savings
Co. vs. Arkansas City, 22 C. C. A., 171; Walla Walla v. City in 177 U. S., 558.
6. 85 Minn., 294.
7. 102 Fed., 663.
8. 115 U. S., 674.
9. 185 U. S., 65.
10. 152 Mich., 65.
11. 22 C. C. A., 171.
12. 101 Iowa, 687.
13. 105 Wise., 76.
14. 36 Iowa, 396.
15. 31 Pa., 175.
16. 5 Heisk, 495.
17. 98 Ill., 415.
18. 48 N. J. L., 378:
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logical question is: WHAT WERE THE CONDITIONS UNDER
WHICH THE COUNCIL INDUCED BUSINESS INTERESTS
TO CONSTRUCT THE WORKS? If it be made to appear that, at
the time the contract was entered into, it was fair and just, AND WAS
PROMPTED BY THE NECESSITIES OF THE SITUATION,
the TIME ELEMENT CANNOT INVALIDATE THE CON-
TRACT. On the other hand, if the contract was unreasonable in its
inception, it was UNREASONABLE AB INITIO, and not because,
in addition, it runs for thirty years. To come to the point, TIME
ELEMENT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE REASON-
ABLENESS OR UNREASONABLENESS OF THE LONG TERM
CONTRACT.
With these fundamental concepts, concerning MUNICIPAL CON-
TRACTS, in mind, it is well to consider the case at hand: Had the
court in the case of Flynn vs. Little Falls Electric & Water Co. ruled
that the contract in its inception was void (as the demurrer in this case
evidenced) because it was unreasonable when made, there would be
no quarrel with the decision. But the court, to use its express words,
says "that the vice, in this contract, consists mainly, if not entirely, in
the length of time for which it bound the city to pay annually this sum
of $4400 for fire hydrants. The hydrants, the price to be paid per hy-
drant, and the other provisions of the ordinance are chiefly important
in so far as THEY BEAR UPON THE QUFSTION OF THE
POWER OF THE COUNCIL TO BIND THE CITY FOR SO
LONG A PERIOD OF TIME!' In other words, the court plainly
states that the time element invalidated the contract.
Still, even though this ruling is out of line with the weight of
authority, this decision would be looked upon as the minority view
had the court used consistent argumentation. An examination of the
successive steps of the opinion shows that the reasoning therein does
not justify the conclusions obtained. In the beginning of the courts
opinion we find this statement:
"Inasmuch as it might be impossible to induce any individual or
corporation to expend the necessary capital to construct waterworks in
a small city without the assurance of patronage by the municipality
itself FOR A DEFINITE AMOUNT OF TIME, we have no doubt
of the power of the city council to make a TIME CONTRACT with
the company for supplying water to the city for fire protection, pro-
vided the time is reasonable. AND AS A SOMEWHAT LIBERAL
CONTRACT in this regard might be necessary to induce men to put
in waterworks at all, we would not be inclined to give any controlling
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss2/4
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weight to the mere fact that the number of hydrants contracted for was
beyond the present needs of the city, or that the price agreed to be
paid was somewhat greater than the value of the use of the hydrants,
CONSIDERED ALONE."
Thus, the court considers the reasonableness of the contract
WHEN IT WAS MADE. In a word, it affirms the policy that the
city council, in inducing men to construct costly waterworks, has the
power to CONTRACT WITH A COMPANY FOR A PERIOD OF
YEARS.
"But the power of the municipal authorities," says the court in
its next step in the argument, "to contract in relation to a given matter
does not carry with it the power to make a contract which shall cede
away, control, or embarrass the legislative or governmental powers.
They have not unlimited and arbitrary discretion to make any kind
of contract theysee fit. If so, the council might make a contract run-
ning for 100, or even 500 years as well as 30 years. The provisions of
this ordinance, providing that the city should pay this price for this
number of hydrants for 30 years is AS TO TIME, unreasonable and
void, as being beyond the scope of authority of municipal authorities."
In view of the previous statements that the validity of the con-
tract depends upon the situation when the contract was made, and
upon the necessity of inducing men to erect costly works, by promises
of LONG TERM CONTRACTS, how can the court CONSISTENT-
LY CONCLUDE THAT THE THIRTY-YEAR TIME ELEMENT
invalidates the contract? Why hasn't the council the right to contract
for 100 years as well as 30 years, if that council follows out the very
formula set forth by the court in its opinion, and, after exercising its
sound discretion, it has been forced to contract for a long term of years
because men could not be induced to construct expensive waterworks
for a shorter period of time? The explanation is dearly this: The
court has lost sight of the distinction between the governmental and
business powers of the city. The rule that the members of the legisla-
tive body of the city may not so act or contract as to deprive their suc-
cessors of the unimpaired exercise of legislative or governmental
powers does not apply in this case; for the power to contract for
waterworks, as WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN A CONSIDERA-
TION OF THE CONCEPTS OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS, is
a proprietary or business power. Accordingly, the city is governed by
the same rules as a private corporation or individual, and may contract
for terms longer than the duration of the terms of office. In fact, this
objection, that the contract shows an attempt to barter away the legis-
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lative powers of the city authorities has been considered in Little Falls
E. & W. Co. vs. City, supra, wherein the very contract which we have
under consideration was before the court, and was held to be untenable.
The next paragraph of the court's opinion is unusual: "Of
course the council remains at liberty to contract for such a supply with
the same company. If in the honest exercise of their legislative discre-
tion, the city council concludes that the city requires 55 hydrants for
fire protection, and that $80 per hydrant is a reasonable price, they
WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO ENTER INTO A CONTRACT
ON THESE TERMS WITH THE WATER COMPANY, to run a
reasonable length of time. * * * * Of course, it is not the purpose of
this court TO DECLARE EVERY CONTRACT FOR A THIRTY
YEAR PERIOD, as a matter of law, UNREASONABLE."
Thus, by reasoning in a circle, so to speak, the court has re-
turned to the same point -rom which it started. Does the court lose
sight of the fact that the old council in 1889 exercised its sound discre-
tion in the same manner as-the contemporary council is now called
upon to do? Suppose the court's advice is followed, and the con-
temporary council, in honest exercise of its legislative power, enters
into a new contract for 100 years. Will such a contract be void? The
only possible answer to our question is that sentence in the opinion
which says that the contract must be for a REASONABLE PERIOD
OF TIME. But the court HAS NOT STATED WHAT A REA-
SONABLE PERIOD OF TIME IS. It cannot be contended that any
period of time under 30 years is reasonable, for in a reargument of the
case, the court stated that it was not its purpose to declare every con-
tract for thirty years, as a matter of law, unreasonable. WE ARE
LEFT IN DOUBT AS TO WHAT A REASONABLE PERIOD OF
TIME IS.
The plain fact of the matter is that the company is at the mercy
of the court. It has constructed costly works, and since its capital is
already invested, it no longer has the necessary bargaining power to
secure reasonable compensation for its services. The city, on the other
hand, is not called upon again to induce capital to its borders; and so
can dictate its own terms in a new contract. In commenting upon a
similar situation, the court, in Reed vs. City of Anoka, supra, lays down
this rule. "To overturn contracts heretofore made in good faith, upon
which large investments of capital have been made, would place those
who have invested their money at the mercy of public agitation and
clamor." In fact, the whole law involved in this case is set forth in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss2/4
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the cases of Walla Walla Water Co. vs. City,19 and Waterworks Co.
vs. Rivers.20 The girst of these two cases is briefly this: "After a com-
pany has erected its works, and has invested its capital, a court may
INQUIRE INTO THE CONTRACT WHEN IT WAS MADE, TO
SEE IF FRAUD WAS PRESENT, OR IF THE CONTRACT WAS
UNREASONABLE WHEN MADE, but the TIME ELEMENT
CANNOT BE SAID TO INVALIDATE THE CONTRACT, for this
would be taking away a vested right, and leaving the company at the
mercy of a court to modify the contract whenever public sentiment
called for such a modification.
As a fitting ending to a poor opinion, the court concludes: "The
business of the water company is affected with public interest and thus
it would not have the right to arbitrarily shut off the water because the
time element of the ordinance is declared void."
Is it not astonishing to think that the court forgets that it is an ele-
mentary principle in the law of contractsthat if a contract is void as to
one party, it is void as to the other. Is the company, to use the logic
of the court, compelled to carry on its business at whatever price or
terms the city determines? True, as long as a public service corpora-
tion choses to do business under a franchise, it is affected with a public
interest, and it must carry out its end of the agreement; but when that
franchise is declared void, through no fault of the company, and the
company decides to stop doing business, it is no longer charged with that
public inferest. THE COMPANY MAY SHUT OFF THE WATER
IF THE CONTRACT IS DECLARED VOID.
In conclusion, it is sufficient to repeat what has already been said:
If a company's contract with a city is void at all, it is void because IT
WAS FRAUDULENTLY MADE, OR WAS UNREASONABLE
IN ITS INCEPTION. On the other hand, the TIME ELEMENT
CANNOT BE SAID TO INVALIDATE THE CONTRACT; for it
can be seen that the term for which such a contract was made WAS
THE VERY CONSIDERATION WHICH CAUSED CAPITAL TO
ERECT ITS COSTLY PLANT. Yet in face of the court's own
premise, that a city, in inducing capital, may contract for a LONG
TERM OF YEARS, provided it exercises its sound discretion, the
court inconsistently concludes that the time element was unreasonable,
and the contract with the company, as set forth by the ordinance, was
void. Without much hesitation, it can be safely concluded that this case,
JAMES C. FLYNN vs. LITTLE FALLS ELECTRIC & WATER
CO., can hardly stand as good logic, much less as an accepted minority
view. ERWIN E. STEINBERG.
19. 172 U. S., 1.
20. 115 U. S., 674.
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